

Theology vol 40

A
VINDICATION
OF
HUMANE LIBERTY:

In Answer to a
DISSERTATION
ON
LIBERTY and *NECESSITY*;
Written by A. C. Esq;

By JOHN JACKSON,
Rector of *Rossington* in the County of *York*, and
Master of *Wigston's* Hospital in *Leicester*.



L O N D O N,

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TO HIS GRACE

J O H N
Duke of Rutland,

KNIGHT of the most Noble Order
of the *Garter*, and CHANCELLOR
of the Dutchy of *Lancaster*.

MY LORD,

 Beg Your Grace's favourable
Acceptance of the small en-
suing Treatise, written in
Defence of the *Liberty of humane*
Actions, which is a Subject of the
greatest Importance, both to *Reli-*
gion and *Civil Society*.

It cannot but be a Concern to all
serious Persons and Lovers of Vir-
tue and true Religion, to see the
Atheistical Principles of *Fate* and
Necessity [no less atheistical and ab-
surd than the old *Epicurean* Hypo-
thesis of all Things being originally

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effected and produced by *Chance*, or by blind undirected *Matter* and *Motion*, without any intelligent first Cause or Agent at all] so strongly pleaded for, and so much to prevail even amongst Men of polite Knowledge and good Sense in other Matters; and in an Age wherein Learning seems to be almost at the Height, and the Evidence both of *natural* and *reveal'd* Religion is set in the clearest and most unexceptionable Light, upon demonstrative Principles of *natural Philosophy*, and a rational Proof of the Truth of the *Scriptures*.

As it is the peculiar Happiness of the present Times, above all precedent Ages since that of the Apostles, that every Degree of *Superstition* (the greatest Obstacle to the Knowledge of the Christian Religion) is discourag'd and confuted; and Christianity (which supposes and is founded upon the Truth of natural Religion) is defended only by Original

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ginal genuine Evidence of Fact, and by Arguments of natural Reason, without Regard to any pretended Authority of Men or of Bodies of Men; or to what they have determin'd by mere pretended Authority to be the *reveal'd Will* of God, or the Rule of *reveal'd Truth*: So it is a great Unhappiness, that, instead of attending to and making use of the rational Means of natural and religious Knowledge, and exercising the Faculty of the Understanding in a free and impartial Search after Truth, Men should abuse the Liberty which they have of judging freely for themselves, and wantonly and licentiously employ their Reason to prove (if that was possible) that there is no such Thing as *Truth* or *Reason*; that the Appearance of Things, to our *Perception* and *Understanding*, is all Fallacy, and that we are perpetually deceiv'd in the Evidence both of our *Sensation* and *Judgement*. This is the manifest Consequence of
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of the Hypothesis that *humane Actions* are *necessary*; which, if true, shews that our *perceptive* Faculty is continually impos'd upon, in our fancying that we have a Power of *acting freely*; which, it is as apparent that we have, as that we *see* or *feel*, or have any *Sensations* at all: and on the same Account, our *Judgement* is no less impos'd on, in making a Distinction betwixt *natural* and *moral* Evil, between *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Right* and *Wrong*; which, upon the Notion of *Fatality*, have no Distinction but *in Name*: all Actions (according to this Doctrine) being alike intrinsically *just* or *unjust*, *good* or *evil*, without any *real* Difference.

This Notion likewise makes void the Obligation of all humane Laws (which suppose the Reality of *humane Agency*) and renders them absurd, in appointing *Rewards* and *Punishments* to prevent *evil* and to promote *good* Actions, which, according to this Scheme, are as *necessary* as the
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Fruitfulness or *Barrenness* of the Seasons, or as bodily *Sickness* or *Health*.

Lastly, the Notion of *Fate* takes away the Foundation of all *religious* Worship, by taking from Men the Power of paying divine Honours and Adoration unto God by *Prayer*, *Praise* and *Thanksgiving*, which in the Nature of them must be supposed to be *personal* and *voluntary* Acts; and which, if *mechanical* and *necessary*, are no more *real* Worship or Piety, than the Motions of the *Elements*, of *Clocks* and *Watches*, or the Pulsation of our Nerves and Arteries are so.

But as your *Grace* is a Lover and Encourager of all useful Knowledge, so I know you to be a Master of the Subject of *humane Liberty*; and with great Pleasure I have found you to be convinc'd of the Unreasonableness of the Scheme of the *Fatality* and *Necessity* of *humane Actions*, which (as I have observ'd) makes void every *moral*, *religious* and *civil* Obligation,

Your

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Your *Grace* hath been pleased to favour with your good Opinion, a Treatise which I wrote on this Subject a few Years ago, and therefore I doubt not of your Approbation of this little Piece; which, tho' too mean a Present to be offer'd to Your *Grace*; yet being the best Token of my Gratitude which at present I have to offer for the great Favours and Benefits bestow'd upon me by Your *Grace*, in the most generous and engaging Manner, I rely upon Your *Grace*'s experienc'd Affability and great condescending Goodness, for the Acceptance of it, with the sincere Expression and Assurance of my being (may it please Your *Grace*)

Your GRACE'S

Most Obliged and Devoted

Humble Servant,

JOHN JACKSON.



A
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 OF
Humane Liberty.



WELVE Years ago Dr. *Clarke* wrote *Remarks* upon a Book entituled, *A Philosophical Enquiry concerning humane Liberty*; which is suppos'd to have been written by *A. C. Esq;* inscrib'd the Author of the present *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity*.

The Doctor in his Remarks answer'd all the Arguments, which that ingenious

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Author brought in Defence of an universal *Fatality*, and of the *Necessity* of humane Actions ; and propos'd several Proofs in the Vindication of the *Liberty* of humane Actions, to which this ingenious Gentleman thought fit to make no Reply.

But now after twelve Years silence, and not till after the Death of Dr. *Clarke*, a Dissertation is publish'd on the same Subject, *with some Remarks upon the late Reverend Dr. Clarke's Reasoning on this Point.*

If the Author had any thing new or real to add on this Subject, to what had been offer'd so long before, and which had been fully consider'd and reply'd to by Dr. *Clarke*, it would have look'd better to have propos'd it whilst Dr. *Clarke* was alive, who was above all Men the greatest Master of this Argument, and the most able to have convinc'd this Author of the mischievous Error, and fatal Consequence of his Opinion : And his *chusing* (I hope he will pardon that Expression) to defer a Vindication of what had been written before, till his learned Opponent
was

was dead, seems to infer that he had not so good an Opinion of his Cause, or of his Arguments in defense of it, as to venture to maintain it against so able and learned an Adversary: tho' yet one who was so great a Lover of Truth, as never to take advantage of the Weakness of his Opponent, or to satisfy himself with merely confuting him by the Superiority of Abilities and Learning; and who always endeavour'd by the clearest and most convincing Reasons to establish what appear'd to him to be Truth, either by a direct Demonstration of it, or by evincing it from the manifest Absurdity of the contrary Notion.

This ingenious Gentleman having collected from Dr. Clarke's *Remarks* and other Writings, what he says are the *Fundamentals from whence all his reasoning against the Necessity of humane Actions is deduc'd*, says in answer to it, that the Doctor *has only begg'd the Question by asserting a self-moving Power in the Soul without proving it, and then reasoning from it as granted him. He supposes (he adds) a self-moving Faculty, which is the Point in dis-*

pute, and then argues that 'tis not passive.

P. 12. In conclusion of his Reply to the Doctor, he thinks *it undeniably follows, that Judgement and Action, such as we are capable of, [meaning not Action, but mere Passiveness] cannot justly be infer'd to depend on Principles totally different from each other, as Activeness and Passiveness are.*

That Dr. Clarke did not beg the Question, and merely suppose *Judgement* and *Action* to depend on Principles totally different from each other, is apparent even from what this Gentleman has collected out of the Doctor's *Remarks*.

The Doctor, to prove his Point, urg'd this Example taken notice of by this Author *A. C. Esq; viz.* " It appears from
 " several Promises (suppose) that 'tis at
 " this Instant *the last Judgement* of the
 " divine Understanding, that 'tis not rea-
 " sonable the World should be destroy'd
 " this Day. Does it, (says the Doctor)
 " follow from thence, that God's *physi-*
 " *cal Power* of destroying it, is not ex-
 " actly the same this Day, as it will be at
 " any time hereafter ?" Now if there is

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no necessary Connection between such a final Judgment, and God's physical Power of Action; if it does not, (as it plainly does not) take away the Possibility of divine Action, or Exertion of divine Power in destroying the World, then it is by the Doctor truly infer'd, that *Judging* and *Acting* depend on Principles totally different from each other, contrary to *A. C.*'s Notion of *Necessity* being the Spring of both of them; and *A. C.*'s Pretence that what we call *Action* and *Passiveness* are really the same, is hereby confuted.

If *A. C.* [who does himself nothing but *suppose*, as I shall show, the Truth of his Opinion of *Judging* and *Acting* flowing from the same Principle of *Necessity*, without proving it at all] could have shewn against Dr. *Clarke*'s Example, either that such a final Judgment of the divine Understanding is impossible or absurd, or that God cannot finally judge it not reasonable to destroy the World to-day, without losing, or being incapable of exerting his natural Power of destroying it to-day; this wou'd have been an
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Answer to the Doctor, and the Doctor must have alleg'd some other Argument to prove his point. But if *A. C.* is not able (as he hath not attempted) to reply to that Argument, he should not say that *Dr. Clarke* begs the Question, when one Proof of it, (amongst several which he offer'd, and of which not one hath yet been answer'd) is left unreply'd to by him. Nay, it now appears, that the Arguments which *Dr. Clarke* had brought for the *free Agency* of God, for the strict and proper *Freedom* of the divine Actions, (which before had been deny'd and traduc'd as *impossible*, and even *Atheistical*, see *Philosophical Enquiry concerning humane Liberty*, p. 59. also *Cato's Letters*, p. 170, 174. and *Defense of humane Liberty*, in answer to them, p. 7—21.) have so far convinc'd this ingenious Gentleman, that he says, *to deny the first Cause to be an Agent, is a Contradiction in Terms*. He therefore ascribes unto God *Action* strictly so call'd, and now only denies it with respect to Man.

P. 12.

Dr. Clarke then has happily gain'd the most important Point of his Adversary, I hope

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hope I may say, of all the Adversaries of *Liberty* or *Action*, and Pleaders for an universal *Necessity* or *Fatality* ; amongst which, *A.C.* is, I think, the most considerable : and therefore I hope his Example and Conviction may be the means of the Conviction of others, and bring them to acknowledge that God is strictly and properly an *Agent* in the Creation of the World, and consequently in the Government of it by his Providence. This is the first and most fundamental Article both of *natural* and *reveal'd* Religion.

The Instance alleg'd by Dr. *Clarke* to prove *judging* and *acting* to be totally different in *God*, may be apply'd to, and will prove the same with respect to *Man*.

Suppose then that 'tis the last Judgement of *A.C.*'s Understanding, that it is not reasonable for him to go a *hunting* this Day, (being, suppose *Sunday*) does it follow from thence that his natural Power of going a *hunting* is not exactly the same this Day as it will be to-morrow, or any time hereafter ? How does his Judgement of the Unfitness of the thing take away his physical *loco-motive* Power and Faculty
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of doing it? And how by thinking it not reasonable to move, is he thereby compell'd to sit still? With whatever Force this Argument proves that there is no Connection between *Approbation* and *Action* with respect to *God*, it proves with equal Force the same thing with respect to Men.

The Connection of Ideas which form the Argument is exactly the same in both respects; and let *A.C.* try if he can shew that there is any Difference in it, when apply'd to *divine*, and when to *humane* Judgement and Action. And if this Argument has convinc'd *A.C.* that with respect to *God* *Action* is not necessarily connected with, and determin'd by the *last Judgement* of the Understanding, it ought by Parity of Reason to convince him that they are not necessarily connected in *Man*; and that as *Necessity* of Judgement does not make *God* a merely *passive* Being, and take away his *Agency*, so neither can it make *Man* a merely *passive* Being, or take away his *Agency*.

There are besides the foregoing Example many other Arguments urg'd by

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Dr. Clarke to demonstrate directly the *free Agency* of God, and which, as *A. C.* ingenuously owns, prove, that *to deny the first Cause to be an Agent, is a Contradiction in Terms.*

I shall now shew *A. C.* that Dr. Clarke brought other Proof for humane Liberty of Action also, which he has thought fit to take no notice of, but which ought to be reply'd to by him; and that the Doctor was really far from begging, as *A. C.* alleges, the Point in question.

Towards the End of *the Remarks*, (p. 42, 43.) the Doctor draws up for him the Sum of what had been said into one Objection, to which the Doctor says, “ if he can give a clear and distinct Answer, after the manner of one who sincerely seeks after the Truth——this whole Matter may then possibly deserve to be reconsider'd.”

“ Man either has within himself a *Principle of Action*, properly speaking, that is, a *self-moving Faculty*, a *Principle or Power of beginning Motion*; or he has not.”

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“ If

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“ If he has *within himself* such a Principle, then he is a *free*, and not a *necessary Agent*. For every *necessary Agent* is mov’d *necessarily* by something else; and then that which *moves* it, not the thing itself which is mov’d, is the *true*, and *only Cause* of the Action.”

“ If Man has not *within himself* a Principle or Power of *Self-motion*, then every *Motion* and *Action* of Man is strictly and properly produc’d by the *Efficiency* of some extrinsic *Cause*: which *Cause* must be either what we usually call the *Motive* or *Reason*, upon which a Man acts; or else it must be some insensible *subtle Matter*, or some *other Being* or *Substance* making an Impression upon him.”

“ If the *Reasons* or *Motives* upon which a Man acts, be the *immediate* and *efficient Cause* of the Action; then either *abstract Notions*, such as all *Reasons* and *Motives* are, have a *real Subsistence*, that is, are themselves *Substances*; or else that *which has itself no real Subsistence*, can put a Body in-
“ to

“ to Motion : either of which is mani-
 “ festly absurd.”

“ If insensible *subtle Matter*, or any
 “ other *Being* or *Substance* continually
 “ making Impression upon a Man, be the
 “ *immediate* and *efficient* Cause of his
 “ acting ; then the *Motion* of that *subtle*
 “ *Matter* or *Substance* must be caus'd by
 “ some *other* Substance, and the Motion
 “ of that by some *other*, till at last we
 “ arrive at a *free Agent* ; and then *Liber-*
 “ *ty* is a *possible* thing ; and then *Man*
 “ possibly may have Liberty : and if he
 “ may *possibly* have it, then *Experience*
 “ will prove that he *probably*, nay, that
 “ he *certainly* has it.”

And that *A. C.* may not think to avoid
 the Force of this Argument by his having
 now yielded to Part of it, namely, that
 God is a *free Agent* ; I shall farther pro-
 pose to his Consideration the distinct Rea-
 soning of Dr. *Clarke* for the *Possibility*
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In the tenth Proposition of his *Demon-*
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Doctor thus argues. " As a Power of
 " beginning Motion (or Liberty) is not
 " in itself an impossible thing ; because
 " it must of necessity be in the supreme
 " Cause ; so neither is it impossible to
 " be *communicated* to created Beings.
 " The Reason is plain ; because no
 " Powers are impossible to be *communi-*
 " *cated*, but only those which imply
 " *Self-Existence* and absolute *Indepen-*
 " *dency*.—I know the Maintainers of
 " Fate are very confident, that a Power
 " of beginning Motion, is nothing less
 " than being really *independent*, or being
 " able to act independently from any supe-
 " rior Cause. But this is only a childish
 " trifling with Words ; for a Power of
 " acting independently *in this sense*, com-
 " municated at the Pleasure of the su-
 " preme Cause, and continued only du-
 " ring the same good Pleasure, is no
 " more a real and absolute Independen-
 " cy, than the Power of *existing*—or
 " than the Power of being *conscious*, or
 " any other Power whatsoever, can be
 " said to imply *Independency*. In reality,
 " 'tis altogether as hard to conceive how

" Con-

“ *Consciousness*, or the *Power of Per-*
 “ *ception* should be communicated to a
 “ created Being, as how the *Power of*
 “ *Self-motion* shou’d be so———yet no
 “ Man doubts but that he himself, and
 “ all others, have truly a *Power of Per-*
 “ *ception* : And therefore in like man-
 “ ner (however hard it may be to con-
 “ ceive, as to the manner of it ; yet
 “ since, as has been now prov’d, it can
 “ never be shown to be impossible and
 “ expressly contradictory, that a *Power*
 “ of *Self-motion* shou’d be communica-
 “ ted) I suppose no considering Man can
 “ doubt but that he actually has also a
 “ *Power of Self-motion*. For the Argu-
 “ ments drawn from continual *Expe-*
 “ *rience* and Observation, to prove that
 “ we have such a *Power*, are so strong,
 “ that nothing less than a strict Demon-
 “ stration that the thing is absolutely im-
 “ possible, and implies an express Con-
 “ tradiction, can make us in the least
 “ doubt that we have it not. We have
 “ all the same Experience, the same
 “ Marks and Evidence exactly of our ha-
 “ ving really a *Power of Self-motion* ; as the
 “ rigidest

“ rigidest Fatalist cou’d possibly contrive
 “ to require, if he was to make a *Sup-*
 “ *position* of a Man’s being endued with
 “ that Power. There is no one thing
 “ which such a Man can imagine ought
 “ to follow from the *Supposition of Li-*
 “ *berty*, which every Man does not now
 “ as much feel, and actually experience
 “ in himself, as it can possibly be ima-
 “ gin’d any Man wou’d do, supposing the
 “ thing were true. Wherefore to affirm,
 “ notwithstanding all this, that the Spi-
 “ rits by which a Man moves the Mem-
 “ bers of his Body, and ranges the
 “ Thoughts of his Mind, are themselves
 “ mov’d wholly by Air, or subtler Mat-
 “ ter inspir’d into the Body ; and that
 “ again by other external Matter, and
 “ so on ; as the Wheels of a Clock are
 “ mov’d by the Weights, and those Weights
 “ by Gravitation, and so on ; without a
 “ Man’s having the least Power, by any
 “ *Principle within himself*, to think any
 “ one Thought, or impel his own Spi-
 “ rits, in order to move any Member of
 “ his Body : All this is so contrary to
 “ Experience, and the Reason of things,
 “ that

“ that unless the Idea of *Self-motion* were
 “ in itself as evidently and clearly a *Con-*
 “ *tradiction*, as that two and two shou’d
 “ make fifteen ; a Man ought to be a-
 “ sham’d to talk at that rate. Nay, a
 “ Man of any considerable Degree of
 “ Modesty, would even in that case be
 “ almost tempted rather to doubt the
 “ Truth of his Faculties, than venture
 “ boldly to assert one so intolerable an
 “ Absurdity, merely for the avoiding of
 “ another. There are some indeed, who
 “ denying Men the Power of *beginning*
 “ *Motion*, would yet seem in some man-
 “ ner to account for their Actions, by
 “ allowing them a Power of *determi-*
 “ *ning* Motion. But this also is a mere
 “ ludicrous trifling with Words ; for if
 “ that Power of *determining* Motion be
 “ no other in a Man, than that which is
 “ in a Stone of reflecting a Ball *one cer-*
 “ *tain way* ; this is just nothing at all :
 “ But if he has a Power of determining
 “ the Motion of his Spirits *any way, as*
 “ *he himself pleases* ; this is in all respects
 “ the very same as *the Power of begin-*
 “ *ning Motion.*”

Thus

Thus much being said with respect to Dr. Clarke, and to shew that A. C's Remarks upon the Doctor's Reasoning on this Point are far from being any just Reply to what the Doctor offer'd against the *Philosophical Enquiry concerning humane Liberty*, which A. C. has undertaken now to defend: I shall proceed to examine the remaining Part of A. C's Dissertation, wherein he endeavours to demonstrate all *humane Actions* to be *necessary*, or that Man is *not* an *Agent* strictly and properly speaking; but that, as he expresses it, *the Action of the Soul is a necessarily determin'd, and immediate Consequence of the last Judgment of the Understanding*. In order to come to a Demonstration of his Notion, he premises several Observations.

P. 1. *It seems strange to him, that this Subject which hath been so long and learnedly controverted, shou'd have receiv'd no Demonstration convincing enough to gain universal Assent to either side of the Question, is Man an Agent or Patient? As if it was so strange, that a demonstrable Truth shou'd not gain universal Assent.*
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The Truth of *humane Liberty* has gain'd as universal an Assent in all Ages as any controverted Truth ever did. This is shewn at large in a Treatise written in *Defence of humane Liberty*, and in answer to *Cato's Letters* on that Subject.

There have been those who deny'd the *free Agency of God*, yet *A. C.* admits it to be a *Demonstration*.

The *Being and Attributes* of God have been deny'd, yet they are strictly *demonstrable*. And the Obligation of the Worship of one God only, in opposition to Idolatry, has been deny'd, yet that is also *demonstrable*. So that it is nothing new or strange, that a Truth which is *demonstrable*, and of the greatest moment too, shou'd be disputed or deny'd, whilst the Corruption of humane Nature is so great, and Prejudices proceeding from vicious Affections are so strong and hard to be overcome by any Conviction.

But *A. C.* intimates that Men's generally assenting to the side of the Question, *that Man is an Agent*, is owing to their not examining the Point, and judging for

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P. 2. themselves in the Love of Truth; but *sitting down content with an implicit Faith.* But surely (adds he) *the Deity hath not invested us with the Faculty of reasoning, to lie dormant, but that it might be exercis'd in the Search after Truth; and I believe it more laudable to fail in that Pursuit, than slavishly to acquiesce in the unexamin'd Opinions of others.* All this is well and rightly said; and I desire leave, by the way, to form from this Observation an Argument or two in Defense of *humane Liberty.*

A. C. says very truly that God has given Man the Faculty of Reason to be exercis'd in the Search after Truth; and, I add, to be the Law and Rule of his Actions, that they may be conformable to *Truth and Right.*

But that evidently can be no Law or Rule, which it is not *in our Power* to observe or keep. And this ingenious Author cannot reasonably upon his Notion, affirm that God design'd that humane Reason shou'd be exercis'd in the Search after Truth, unless God has put it in every Man's own Power and free Choice to
exercise

exercise his reasoning Faculty in this Search. 'Tis certain, that every Man does not thus exercise his reasoning Faculty; and if all are under Compulsion in the use of it, then they who do not use it in the Search after Truth, are not only without Blame; but the Motives which compel them to let their reasoning Faculty lie dormant and unexercis'd, being the Power and Work of God acting upon the Mind by second Causes, and under which the Mind is passive; 'tis hence evident that God did not invest them with the Faculty of Reason, that it might be exercis'd in the Search of Truth; but that on the contrary, God invested many with the reasoning Faculty, that they might not exercise it in the Search after Truth.

So that 'tis infallibly certain, that the great Truth which *A. C.* hath asserted, will not hold upon any other Foundation than the Supposition of Men's having it in their own *Choice* and *Power* to exercise their Reason in the Search after Truth, for which purpose God gave it to them. And it is undoubtedly the Fault,

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not of *God's Creation*, as the antient Fatalists suppos'd ; but of the *humane Will*, that Men do not exercise their Reason as they ought, in an impartial Search after Truth, and acting agreeably to it.

2. Man wou'd be in vain invested with *Reason*, if it was not in his Power to use it in the Direction of his Actions, or if he cou'd not freely exert himself in Actions conformable to *right Reason*.

Reason wou'd be of little benefit, if they who are endued with it cou'd not of themselves apply it to the Conduct of their Actions. If God by himself, or by second Causes, as *A.C's* Notion supposes, really was the *Doer* of what we call the *Actions* of Men ; then 'tis evidently all one with respect to these Actions, whether Men are invested with the Faculty of Reason or not. They might be exactly what they are, if Man had no Reason at all ; and Men are no more really concern'd in their own *Actions*, than Clocks and Watches are in their own *Motions*.

Farther, it is the greatest Absurdity to suppose that God shou'd give unto Men

so noble a Faculty as that of Reason, by which the Mind is capable of performing the bravest and best Actions; that he shou'd illuminate their Minds with this heavenly Light, to enable them to see the Perfections of his *Power, Wisdom, and Goodness*; and yet that he shou'd not put it in their power to imitate his divine Perfections, in doing always Actions which their Reason tells them are right and good: But that on the contrary, he should by other Causes, which are not in their power, forcibly draw them to act [if that can be call'd *Action*, which is mere *Passiveness*] contrary to the Light and Dictates of their Reason, and the Truth of things which they see and know. It is plainly more rational that God shou'd not have given to Men Reason at all; unless either by his overruling Power their Actions shou'd always be made conformable to it, as his own Actions invariably are; and so the *natural* Evils of Life, which proceed from the Abuse of it, be prevented: Or else, since humane Actions are not always reasonable, the Unreasonableness of them shou'd

shou'd flow (not from the divine irresistible Power, but) from Men's *free Choice*, and so they be accountable to God for them. And 'tis infinitely absurd to suppose that God, who in his own personal Actions always does that which is agreeable to the *Truth* and *Reason* of things, shou'd by his immediate Power, or by second Causes, compel Men to do what is contrary to them : This evidently makes God (who is a perfect Being) inconsistent with himself, which is a Contradiction.

Therefore if *A.C.* who wants no Abilities or Penetration, where Prejudice is not in the way, had consider'd well and impartially the Nature of *humane Reason*, he might have seen that liberty of acting was a direct Consequence of it. *Reason* and *Liberty* are essentially connected in the divine Mind ; and because God is the most perfect in *Reason*, he is also thereby the most perfect in *Power*, or *Liberty* of Action : And *Reason* so naturally infers *Liberty* in the humane Mind, that without Liberty, Reason is in vain, as I have shewn, and the investing

vesting Men with it in their present Circumstances, evidently absurd. Nay, in one respect, Reason and Liberty are but one; for tho' Reason does not necessarily infer a Power over our *bodily* Motions and *external* Actions, yet Reason proceeds from a Power of the Mind, whereby it *attends* to, *reflects* upon, *compares*, *abstracts* and *compounds* Ideas within it; and all these are *internal Actions*, and *voluntary*.

Whence the most reasonable thinking Men in all Ages have always thought the Faculty of *Reason* to be a direct Proof of *free Agency*.

To conclude this Argument drawn from the Author's Observation; as *Reason* demonstratively infers *free Agency*, so it is, I think, true, that *Sensation* infers a lesser Degree of Agency, which we call *Spontaneity*, and belongs to Animals not endued with Reason. And as every Animal endued with Life and Sensation has some degree of Liberty of acting; so Man has a greater degree of Agency than Brutes, only as being invested with that Reason which they have not, and proportionably

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tionably to it: and God has the most perfect Liberty, superior to that of every Creature, because he is perfect in Reason, which they are not. For the true and perfect Liberty of a *rational Agent* consists (not in being able to act *with Indifference* and *equal Inclination*, upon *reasonable* or *unreasonable* Motives, which is absurd; and I wonder that the Maintainers of Necessity and Fate shou'd universally fall into so plain an Error, as to think so, but) in having a clear and perfect View of the Nature of things, with a Power of Action, and being influenc'd by no other Motives to act, but the Nature of the things themselves. See *Defense of Humane Liberty*, P. 21, 22, 23, 24.

Whence it undeniably follows, that the Freedom of Agency is always proportionable to the Degree of *Reason* with which the Mind is endued in every Action: and we may with Certainty conclude, that God, who is himself *an Agent*, (as *A. C.* says rightly is *Demonstration*) and is most perfectly so, as being most perfect in the Faculty of *Reason*, has also
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made Man, whom he hath invested with the Faculty of Reason in his Proportion, *an Agent*; but he is less perfect than God in his Agency, proportionably to the lesser Degree of Reason, with which his imperfect Nature is invested.

I proceed to the particular Examination of the rest of the Observations which *A.C.* offers, in order to his demonstrating the *Necessity of humane Actions*.

He says, *the Soul is apparently passive in Sensation*. This no one denies; because outward Objects, and inward bodily Motions, immediately and instantaneously affect the Soul thro' the Organs of Sense and animal Spirits *within*, without our being able to hinder the Impression of them. So far the Soul is *passive*. But this Sensation is not *Action*, is quite different from it: and even *Sensation* in one respect is the Effect of *Will* and *Choice*; in that it is in every one's power *to apply* their Senses to this or to that Object, or not apply them; and also to apply them more or less to any Object: This Application and Attention is as apparently a *free Act*, as the

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mere Sensation of any Object, when the Senses are apply'd to it, is *necessary*.

P. 4. But *A. C.* talks very unlike a Metaphysician in his giving an Account of the *Passiveness* of Sensation; he says, *it is the immediate Result of an Object's affecting the Soul; which Affection in any Instant of Time is as inevitably determin'd in regard to its Manner, as the Modes of Matter.* What being *as inevitably determin'd in regard to its Manner, as the Modes of Matter*, means, is not easy to be understood. I shall leave this ingenious Writer to explain himself at leisure; only observing that the Manner of any Sensation does not depend merely upon the *Mode* of the objective Matter acting upon the Sense, but very much upon the Disposition of the Organ which receives the Impression of it. But the Proof of his Argument is very extraordinary indeed; he says, *that to deny it, were to assert that two Particles of Matter might be in the same Place at the same Time:* and thus *A. C.* thinks he has demonstrated that the *Soul is passive in Sensation.* But such Demonstrations
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will never convince a Man that knows any thing of Demonstration. He had much better have taken the Point for granted (which no body wou'd have disputed with him) *that the Soul is passive in Sensation*, than go about to prove it by a Demonstration *ex absurdo*, which will as well demonstrate any thing else as his Position; and which Position, tho' in itself indisputable, by his preposterous way of Proof, may be liable to be controverted with him. For to deny his Assertion of, and Argument for the *Passiveness of Sensation*, is no more to assert that *two Particles of Matter might be in the same Place at the same Time*, than the denying any other thing is to assert it. Such Reasoning as this was not indeed fit to have been offer'd to Dr. Clarke.

From *Sensation*, A. C. goes on to the P. 4. Faculty of *Reflection*, and says, *that the Soul is passive in Reflection may be prov'd from its being the immediate Consequence of past Sensations affecting the Soul—Reflection is in reality no other than Consciousness, which when 'tis exercis'd about material Objects, is term'd Sensation;*

- P. 5. *tion ; and when on Ideas, Reflection. If this Proof that the Soul is passive in Reflection was defective, an Appeal to each Individual's Experience will be a Demonstration to him. Does any one voluntarily recall into his Mind Ideas that destroy his Quiet ? Do they not forcibly obtrude on him ? Or can he at pleasure exchange a Train of distracting Thoughts for a Succession of such as will afford him Delight ? If not, adieu Freedom of Reflection.* All this looks somewhat plausible, and yet every Part of it is either directly false, or mere quibble, or nothing to the purpose. Therefore on the direct contrary to *A. C's* Reasoning, it may be prov'd that the Soul is *not passive* in Reflection, because it is not the *immediate* Consequence of past Sensations affecting the Soul. I do not believe that *A. C. immediately* reflects on every Object which strikes his Senses ; I am sure 'tis in his power not to do it. How many Objects strike our Senses without our ever reflecting on them ? And whenever we reflect on any Object or Sensation, it is a *voluntary Act* of the Mind ;

Mind; and we dwell upon the Object, and reflect more or less, *as we please*; and in many Cases we act without any Reflection at all. A Man must know little of his own Nature, or of the Workings of his own Mind, that does not perceive that *Sensation* and *Reflection* proceed from different Causes, and are very different Powers of the Mind.

He feels Sensations from the Impression of Objects *without*, and from Motion *within*, without having any power not to feel them: here he is *passive*, and cannot but think so. But when he *reflects* upon any Objects or Ideas, he *voluntarily* keeps the Objects or Ideas fix'd upon his Senses, or his Mind, which otherwise wou'd be gone, and be succeeded by others. He *deliberately* views and considers them; *compares* them with other Objects and Ideas, *abstracts* or *compounds* them, and forms by the power of his Understanding Ideas in his Mind, which resemble nothing from without; and makes Inferences and Conclusions from them. This Exercise and Work of the Mind is as evidently *voluntary*, as that the Sensations
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of it are *not voluntary*. 'Tis evident that we *can*, and *do* by our *Will*, or a *voluntary Exertion* of our Mind, without being affected *immediately* by any Object *from without*, recall out of our Memories, and present to our Minds afresh *at pleasure*, *Ideas* whose Objects or Ideatums are no more ; and reflect upon them more or less, without suffering our *Senses* to interrupt us by other Objects ; or the animal Spirits within, to excite and present other Ideas to us. And this *Reflection* is quite different from *Sensation* ; it is not exercis'd upon *external* Objects, or any material Impressions, but on abstract Ideas *within* : and tho' *Consciousness* must go along with it, yet 'tis a different Mode of *Consciousness* from that which is properly *Sensation*, and hath a different Spring and Origin.

And altho' some Objects *without*, or Ideas excited by the Spirits in the Mind *within*, will cause the Mind to reflect more suddenly and immediately upon them, than other some ; and upon Reflection raise a quick Sense of *Pleasure* or *Pain* : yet no reasonable Man's Experience

rience can tell him that this is a *Demonstration that the Soul is passive in Reflection*. Men perpetually do recall *voluntarily* into their Minds, *Ideas that destroy their Quiet*, as well as those which excite *Pleasure* in them. That which deceives *A. C.* is, that, because the *Pain* which naturally attends Reflection on some sort of Ideas, irresistably affects the Mind, when it *reflects* upon them; therefore he imagines the Mind is *passive* in the *Reflection*, as well as in the *Pain* attending it: which is just the same as arguing, that because, if I open my Eyes when the Sun shines, I cannot help seeing Light; therefore I cannot help opening my Eyes, or have no power to shut them.

The Truth is; that the Mind *voluntarily* recalls the Ideas, or *reflects* upon them; and howsoever distracting or dissatisfying some Ideas may naturally be, when reflected on, the Mind has a power to lay them aside, or to exchange them for others; and by attending well to them, and comparing them with other Ideas can abate, and by degrees remove from them that Pain or Uneasiness, which
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is apt otherwise to attend them. Do not many, by *Reason* and *Consideration*, overcome the distracting Uneasiness which Ideas of *Hatred* or *Love*, &c. often occasion? And howbeit, when the Mind is habituated to reflect upon any sort of Ideas, they will more forcibly obtrude themselves upon it than others, to which it is not so much used; yet as this Habit of attending to particular Ideas is always contracted by the Mind by degrees, and *voluntarily*; so by degrees the Mind can divest itself of the Habit, weaken the Force of the Ideas, and keep them at as a great distance from it, and *voluntarily* admit or exclude them with as much ease, and as much *at pleasure*, as any other Ideas. And if this was not so, how comes it that the same kind of Ideas, which affect the Senses *without*, or the animal Spirits *within*, with the same Quickness and Force at one time as at another, do not cause the same Sensation in the Mind, or upon Reflection, always excite the same degree of *Pleasure*, or of *Pain*? No Account can, I think, be given of this, but that the Mind by *voluntary*

untary Attention and Consideration, and having other Ideas ready at Command to compare with them, or to oppose to them, rebates their Force, or alters the manner of their Impression.

Therefore *A. C.*'s arguing interrogatorily, *Does any one voluntarily recall into his Mind Ideas that destroy his Quiet? Do they not forcibly obtrude on him? Or can he at pleasure exchange a Train of distracting Thoughts, for a Succession of such as will afford him Delight?* is all mere Quibble and Fallacy. All *Reflection* is at first *voluntary* in the Mind endued with Reason; but by long and anxious Thinking, or bodily Disorders, some Objects may so distract and weaken the Mind, that as the Ideas will force themselves upon it, so the Mind may have little or no Power to prevent the Distraction naturally in particular Circumstances attending Reflection on them. This is the Case of *Madness* and *Melancholy*, wherein Men lose their *reasoning Faculty*, and consequently, *Liberty of Action*: the same may be caus'd by a *Fever*; and in a lesser Degree is conse-

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quent to all unreasonable Habits. But what sort of a Reasoner is he, who shall from such Cases argue, that Men are universally *passive* in their *Reflections*? that when we have no unnatural Disorder of Spirits, no unreasonable Habits; and have the Use of Reason, and are cool in our Thoughts and Tempers, that then we are *passive in our Reflections*; that all our *deliberate* Studies and Exercises of Mind, and *Attention* to the Businesses of Life, are *forc'd* upon us, like the Distractions of *Madness*, or the Ravings of Persons in a *Fever*, or the unnatural, irrational Pleasures of Fools and Idiots? And because Men cannot in all Circumstances, and under all Dispositions of Mind *exchange at pleasure* their Ideas, that they cannot in any: and that Men in their Senses, and acting with the most deliberate Reason, have no more *Liberty* or Power over their *Actions*, than *Fools* or *Madmen*. This is strictly *A. C's* Reasoning, and this is his *Demonstration*; but whether it is any thing like *Demonstration*, or even the Reasoning of a sober and thinking Man, every intelligent Reader may judge.

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From *Reflection A. C.* proceeds to consider the Nature of *reasoning* and *judging*; P. 6, 7, 8. and having premis'd that the Soul is *passive* in *reasoning* and *judging*, by which he means, in forming by its reasoning Faculty a Judgment of things, which nobody denies, (since no one can help judging that to be true or false, which appears to his Understanding to be true or false; any more than a Man can avoid seeing that to be blue, which he sees is blue.)

He comes next to the Proof of his main Proposition, and says, *He will endeavour to demonstrate that the Action of the Soul is a necessarily determin'd, and immediate Consequence of the last Judgment of the Understanding.* P. 13.

His Demonstration is founded upon the Hypothesis *that the Soul is acted upon by Ideas, as Matter is by Matter.* P. 13. He proves his Hypothesis thus; viz.

1. *Matter is capable of receiving different Modes, so is the Soul various Affections.* P. 14, 15. How this is any thing to the purpose, I cannot see; so I pass on to his second Proposition, which is:

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2. *A Particle of Matter, tho' it admits of various Modes, is identically the same Substance; so is the Soul notwithstanding its receiving Variety of Affections.*

This being just as much tending to Demonstration of the Point as the first Proposition, I go on to his third.

3. *Matter wou'd remain in one determin'd Mode, if no other Part of Matter were apply'd to alter it; so wou'd the Soul be perpetually employ'd by one Affection, unless some intervening Idea diverted its Operation.*

The first Part of this Proposition is not true; for *God*, or any *spiritual Agent*, as the *humane Soul*, can alter the Modes of Matter immediately, without the Application of Matter. The Mind by a Thought can immediately alter the Motion of the Blood and animal Spirits.

Secondly; if he means by the second Part of the Proposition, that the Soul wou'd be employ'd about no more than *one Idea* or *Sensation*, if it had no more than *one* to employ it, which is all I can make of his Words; it is indeed very shrewdly

shrewdly said, and just as much to the purpose as the two first Propositions : therefore *A. C.* adds fourthly ;

4. *The Application of Matter to Matter is so far the Cause of its changing its pristine Mode, as without it 'twould not have receiv'd a new one :* [this, if it was to the purpose, is not true ; because *God*, or the *humane Soul* can at pleasure, without the Intervention of Matter, change the Modes of it] *so the Application of an Idea to the Soul is the Cause of its receiving a particular Affection, which otherwise it wou'd not have been conscious of.* Admitting this last Observation to be true, it is nothing to the purpose. The Question is, whether the Soul cannot *voluntarily* reflect upon Ideas, howsoever Ideas, whether upon *Sensation* of them, or *Reflection* upon them, may alter the Affections of the Soul : and whether, when it *acts*, it is forc'd by any Ideas, or makes them only Motives of its *voluntary* Exertion. We are as far from Demonstration of the *Passiveness* of the Soul with respect to *Action*, as ever. The foregoing Premi-

ses, which ought to be *self-evident* Truths; and to have an immediate Reference to the Conclusion, in order to form a *Demonstration* from them, are evidently, either false, or nothing at all to the purpose. Yet *A. C.* is so convinc'd by them, that he says; *if these Premises be admitted true, the Consequence which unavoidably follows, is, that the Soul is acted by the last Judgment of the Understanding.* It would make one smile to hear this Gentleman talk of *Demonstrations* and *Consequences*, which he seems to call every thing by at random, how erroneous, or foreign to the purpose soever it is; for his Premises as much demonstrate *Transubstantiation*, as the Point in question.

I have always found atheistical Unbelievers [and I'll prove *A. C.*'s Notion to be Atheism, before I have done] to be as *credulous* as the most *superstitious* Persons in the World; for they believe the most absurd things upon the weakest Evidence, and in opposition to the plainest Truths; and form their Notions on the most unconnected Ideas. Upon the Premises before

fore laid down by *A. C.* he fancies that *he has as clear an Idea, and is equally* P. 15. *conscious that his Soul is acted upon,* [which in the immediately preceding Words he explains, by being *exerted into Action*] *by Ideas, as that his Body is actuated by his Soul;* that is, he is as clear that *abstract Ideas*, which are not *Substances*, can put the Body into Motion, as that the *Soul* can.

But lest the foregoing Demonstration (which is a strange one indeed) shou'd not convince his Readers of the Truth of his Hypothesis, he demonstrates it otherwise, thus; *viz.*

It is admitted (he says) *by his Oppo-* P. 16. *nents, that the Soul is passive until and in its last Judgement.*

I know of none of his Opponents who admit this; I am sure Dr. *Clarke* nowhere admits it. On the contrary, the Soul, as I have shewn above, is *active* even in the forming or receiving of *Sensations*; *viz.* by the *voluntary Application* of the Senses to Objects more or less, to this, or to that Object *as it pleases*. This Experience proves to be Fact.

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2. The Soul is always *active* in *Reflection* [excepting perhaps in *Ideots* and *Madmen*, who reflect very little, and seem to be govern'd wholly by the Impulse of Sense] tho' it is not always *active* in an equal Degree. In forming the *Judgement* it is indeed *passive*, *i. e.* in assenting to the *Truth* or *Falshood* of a Proposition upon precedent Ideas; or to the *Fitness* or *Unfitness* of an *Action* to be done. If this is all that *A. C.* means by the *last Judgement*, I grant the Soul is *passive* in it; and let him make what use he can of it to his Purpose: but if he means any thing more, namely, the *Resolution* of the Soul [drawn from, and accompanying the last Judgement] to *do*, or *not* to do a thing; in this I affirm the Soul to be *free* and *active*; it is then no longer *passive Judgment*, but *voluntary Choice*. This Distinction being made to avoid quibbling, let him proceed.

P. 16. *First, the Action* (says *A. C.*) *either instantaneously follows that last Judgement of the Understanding; or,*

2. *There is a Suspension of Thought for some Time, and then the Soul is exerted to*

to *Action*, in correspondence with the last Judgement of the Understanding; or,

3. *The Soul acts independent of, and* ^{P. 17.} *unaffected by any prior Judgement of the Understanding.*

One of these three (he adds) must be the Case; and in each of them the *Action* is necessary. He demonstrates it thus; viz.

First, *If, as by the first Supposition, the Action instantaneously follows the last Judgement, that Action is as evidently the Consequence of the last Judgement, as the Perception of an Object is the unavoidable Result of the Object's affecting the Soul, which is acknowledg'd necessary.*

This is more like reasoning than any thing we have had yet (tho' there is really nothing in it) and to it I answer;

1. *Humane Action* does not so instantaneously follow the last Judgement, as the *Perception* of an Object does the Object's affecting the Soul: so this is begging the Question. But if it did;

2. It cannot be rightly argued, that where the *Action* does instantaneously follow the Judgement, there the *Action* is

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not *free*. For this is the Case with respect to the Agency of *God*, which nevertheless *A. C.* acknowledges to be *free*; and it may be so, for ought he knows, in the Exertion of the humane Soul. And upon Supposition of its being so, I might as well argue that that *Sensation* is *voluntary*, which immediately follows any *voluntary* Act, as *Heat* upon my *voluntary* drinking a *Quantity* of Spirits, or hot Liquors; as *A. C.* can argue that any *Action* is *Passion*, which immediately follows the *last Judgement*, which is *passive*. For as that which is *voluntary* may be instantaneously connected with that which is *necessary*, so that which is *necessary* may be instantaneously connected with that which is *voluntary*.

3. When in Men Actions seem *instantaneously* to follow the Perception of Ideas, it is generally where there is little or no *Reflection* or *Judgement* made, as in *Children*, *Idiots*, and *Men distracted*, whose Motions are like the *Spontaneity* of Brutes, and seem to be the Impulses of Ideas, and to have but in them a small Degree of Agency; and in some Cases,
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none at all. But the *rational* Actions of Men are not of this sort; but are done with precedent *Deliberation* and *Reflection*, which are *voluntary*; and tho' the *Judgement* form'd upon *voluntary* Deliberation and Reflection be *necessary*, and *Action* follow more or less immediately, this is no Consequence at all of the *Action's* being *necessary*; because it is quite different from the *Judgement* which preceded it; and has no other relation to it than *Concomitancy*. I take it to be humane Imperfection, that a Man is forc'd to reflect long and *deliberate* in doing many of his Actions; *i. e.* he cannot perform them *rationally*, without *chusing* to do so: and as precedent *Deliberation* is, tho' a Token of *Imperfection*, a certain Proof of the Action deliberated upon being *voluntary*; so if his Abilities were such, that he cou'd both *judge* and *act* instantaneously, and yet *with Reason*, in all his *Actions*, as more perfect Agents probably can, and as he himself seems to do in many Actions which are of least Moment, or of an indifferent Nature, and which require little or no precedent

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Reflection; it wou'd by no means hence follow that such an Improvement of humane Faculties wou'd be inconsistent with Freedom of acting, or that his Actions, which *instantaneously* follow'd his last Judgement were not free.

A. C. goes on; *If the second Supposition be true, the Action is without doubt the Consequence of the last Judgement of the Soul before that Suspension of Thought; or a new Judgement form'd on the old Premises, which must still be allow'd the last Judgement of the Understanding.*

This Argument is not at all to the purpose; for an Action may be the *Consequence* of a *Judgement*, without following it *necessarily*. And farther, *A. C.* is to reconcile *Suspension* of Action by the Mind, with *Necessity* of Action. If the Action *necessarily* follow'd the last Judgement, 'tis evident there cou'd be no *Suspension*, no not for a Moment, any more than there is *Suspension* in a Balance whether it shou'd move, when a Weight is fix'd to one End of it. Therefore, tho' it is not a Consequence that all Action must be *necessary*, which *instantaneously* follows

lows the Judgement; yet it is a Consequence, that if Actions were *necessary* they wou'd instantaneously, without any *Suspension*, follow the Judgement which necessarily determin'd the Exertion of them; as *natural* Effects do their Causes; and as *Perception* instantaneously follows the *Impression* of an Object, wherein there is no *Suspension* in the perceptive Faculty; as (suppose) whether I shou'd *see* or *hear*, when the Objects of these Senses affect the Soul.

So that the Mind, when it has form'd its last Judgement, upon which the Event shews that it does act, having still a Power within it to *suspend* the Action for a longer or a shorter Time; this, I think, is an infallible Proof of its acting *voluntarily*; the *Will*, which caus'd the *Suspension*, and of which there is no other Cause, being the *immediate* and *efficient* Cause of the *Action*. This is largely prov'd in *the Defense of humane Liberty* against *Cato's* Letters, P. 114, 115, 116, 117.

The Proof of the third Supposition which *A. C.* offers is strange Reasoning
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indeed. He says; *if the Soul acts independent of any prior Judgement of the Understanding, its Action is involuntary, (having nothing to determine it) and consequently necessary.*

This Argument is an Heap of Errors and Contradictions.

1. If the Soul acts from the mere Efficiency of its *Will* to act, without regard to any prior *Judgement, Consideration* or *Motive*, as is apparent in a thousand Actions of an indifferent Nature, is its Action therefore *involuntary*? Cannot I *open* or *shut* my Eyes; *sit* down, or *walk*; *lie* down, or *rise*; *move* any of my Limbs, or *not move* them, merely because *I will* to do so? Or can *Necessity* determine me to *open* and *shut* my Eyes, *sit down* and *walk* (which are contrary Actions) almost in the same Moment, without any external or apparent Motive for me to do so? If my Actions then are determin'd by my *Will*, they are not determin'd by *nothing*.

2. If nothing determines humane Actions, how does it thence follow that they are *necessary*? The true Consequence

quence certainly is, that Men cannot act at all, if nothing determines them to act. This is self-evident. No; but says *A. C.* if they are determin'd by nothing at all, they are *necessary*, *i. e.* they are determin'd by *Necessity*, they are the Effect of *necessary Causes*: and is this being determin'd by nothing at all? it is much truer that *A. C.*'s Proposition is prov'd by *nothing at all*. But,

3. Tho' the last Judgement of Man's Understanding does not *compel* him to act, yet in *moral* and *rational* Actions he does not act independent of Reasons and Motives, upon which his Judgement of the Fitness of Actions is form'd. It is the Property and Perfection of a *rational Agent* to act upon precedent rational Motives and Considerations. *Reason* is given us to direct our *Choice* aright. But it is no Consequence, that, because we make *Reason* the Ground of our Actions, our Actions are not *free*.

I have prov'd above, that the more *rational* Men act, the more *freely* they act; and *A. C.* confesseth, that God is an *Agent*, and acts freely, tho' yet he never

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acts (unless in things in their own Nature *indifferent*) by *mere Will*, but always upon the Motives of immutable *Reason*. 'Tis then very unreasonable to argue, that the more perfect humane Nature is; the more like unto the divine Nature by the Participation of *Reason*; and the more we act, like God, upon the Principles and Motives of *Reason*, we are therefore not *free* in those very Actions, in which we most resemble the perfect *Liberty* of the divine *Agency*.

If any thing can farther shew a more perverse way of arguing against the plainest Evidence of the thing; it is that which follows.

P. 19. *A Person* (says *A. C.*) *judges it best for him to walk; and in order to prove that he has a Liberty of acting, in direct Opposition to that last Judgement, he sits still. 'Tis plain* (adds *A. C.*) *the Person is necessitated so to do from the influencing Pleasure he receives from that Act, which compels him to abstain from what he before thought reasonable.*

Can any thing be more evident than that in the foregoing Instance the mere
Will

Will of the Person is the Cause of his *sitting still*? What Medium can possibly be conceiv'd betwixt his *last Judgement* of the Reasonableness of walking, which is here oppos'd, and his *Will* which opposeth it? If *A. C.* was not greatly blinded with Prejudice, he would see that the *influencing Pleasure* which he assigns for the Cause of acting against his Judgement, is the Pleasure only of acting by mere *Will*, of gratifying his *Will* in opposition to Reason, or acting, as it is call'd, by mere *Wilfulness*. For had it been not only *unreasonable*, but also *uneasy* or *painful* for the Person *to sit*, he might still have *sate*, to shew his *Liberty* of acting by mere *Will* and *Pleasure*; and then according to *A. C.* the *influencing Pleasure* compelling him to *act*, wou'd have been the influencing Pleasure of *Pain*. How many Men do a thousand Actions contrary both to Reason and their Ease, merely out of *Wilfulness*? *A. C.* therefore, when he put the Instance which confutes his Notion, had better have said roundly, as *Cato* did (P. 179.)

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that the Person was *necessitated* by his *Will* to act.

P. 19, 20. In conclusion, *A. C.* endeavours to obviate some Objections against the Necessity of humane Actions; as,

First, that it is *a debasing the Soul to make it passive*. He thinks it is not; and that the humane Soul is superior to Brutes, *by being acted upon in a more diversify'd manner*. But he does not consider that the Notion of the *Necessity* of humane Actions makes Men more miserable by Nature than the Beasts are; because the greatest Part of Men are made miserable by those *Vices*, of which the brute Creatures are not capable.

As the irrational Animals have less *Liberty* in their Actions than Men have; so they have not so much occasion for it, as being not endued with *moral* Faculties, nor with those Passions of humane Nature, which require a Power in the humane Mind to direct them, and make them subservient to the Ends design'd to be promoted by them.

Humane Passions, when unrestrain'd and impetuous, are both more mischievous

vous to Mankind, and more tormenting to the Persons actuated by them, than those of Brutes are: and Man must be in the most wretched Condition, if he is irresistably carried on by the Force of his Appetites and Passions, into all the Vices and Enormities which he commits; and which cannot but excite in him great Pain and Uneasiness, as being contrary to that Reason of his Nature which tells him, and by which he cannot but see and know, that what he does is vile, base and wrong, and destructive of all true Happiness.

The Extensiveness of his Faculties, which *A. C.* assigns for his Preheminence above the Beasts, is the Ground only of making him more miserable than them, if he has no power to make use of his *Reason*, which is the only means of rendering him more happy than they are.

To be endued with *Reason*, and yet to be conscious, to know and to feel that it is trampled upon, insulted and abused by inordinate Appetites and Passions, without having it in our power to rescue ourselves from such a wretched State,



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and to make ourselves happy by acting agreeably to the best and highest Faculty of our Nature, is a most intolerable Slavery : and Man had much better be deprived of his *Reason*, and not be conscious of the Immorality and Iniquity of his Actions, which cannot but more or less distract and torment him, whilst any Reason is left in him to reflect upon them ; than to have it only to augment his Misery, without its being able to ease or deliver him, by subduing his Passions, and rendering his Actions conformable to the Dictates of a rational Nature.

But on the other hand, suppose Man to have it in his power to exercise his *reasoning* and *moral* Faculty to the Conduct of his Actions, he is then much preferable to the brute Creatures ; is capable of Happiness which they cannot enjoy ; and may make his Appetites and Passions Instruments of real and lasting Felicity ; and is miserable only thro' his own Fault, and those Crimes which he may prevent, and by which he is made uneasy that he may prevent them : and tho' he cannot be secure from the natural Evils of Life,
yet

yet he may be free from the much greater Unhappiness of *Vice* and *moral* Evil. But as *Vice* and *moral* Evil are but empty Names on Supposition of the *Necessity* of humane Actions; so it would be absurd on this Supposition, that the Author of Nature shou'd make the Uneasiness of *Remorse* and *Self-condemnation* to attend the Commission of *moral* Evil, of *Murder* or *Injustice*, any more than the *accidental* hurting another in his Body or Fortune, or even the taking away his Life or Estate by the Execution of Laws. There is evidently no more Reason for the Pain of *Remorse* in the one Case than in the other: and it is unaccountable that God shou'd so frame the Mind (if acted upon by *necessary* Causes) as to have the same uneasy Consciousness of Guilt in doing Wrong or Evil, as it wou'd have, if the doing of it proceeded from *Choice* and *voluntary Agency*.

The Argument holds with equal Force in respect of the Pleasure of *Self-approbation* arising from the Consciousness of doing or having done *virtuous, brave* and *beneficent* Actions; of which Pleasure

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sure we have no Sensation, either from Actions of an *indifferent* Nature, or from things in which we are *passive*. Has any one the same *inward* Satisfaction and Self-delight from the Exercise of *riding* (suppose) or in having a *quick* or *strong* Eyesight; as he has in being *upright* and *charitable*; in having *serv'd his Country*; in being a Friend to Mankind by the most *benevolent* Principles and Conduct; and in promoting the Interest of true Religion by a *rational Worship* of God, and the Practise of moral Duties? Yet upon Supposition of humane Actions being *necessary*, there is no more *real Virtue* or *Merit* in the one than in the other, and consequently no more real Ground to be *pleas'd* with ourselves, or to be *commended* by others for the one than for the other. I shou'd be glad to see any of the Assertors of *Fate* give a direct and satisfactory Answer to these Objections against their Notion.

Secondly, A. C. argues that the Doctrine of *Free Will* will not account for the *Origin of Evil*, because God *foreknowing* the evil Actions of Men, and not restrain-
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ing them by his *Omnipotence*, is the Cause of them.

This Argument supposes that *Free Will* cannot be communicated by God unto Men, without charging himself with their Abuse of it; and because God has been so good, as to put it in Men's power to advance their Natures to all the moral Perfection they are capable of, by the Exercise of so excellent a Faculty, as the *Will*; and which in the very Nature of it supposes a Power of doing *Evil* as well as *Good*; therefore *He* is the *Doer* of all the *Evil* effected by it. If Men were depriv'd of the physical Power of doing *Evil*, they wou'd also have no power of doing *well*; and so the very Ground of that *moral Happiness*, which *Will* was given to procure for us, wou'd be taken away. Hence it appears that *moral Evil* can have no other Origin than the humane *Will*; for *Will* being suppos'd in an imperfect Agent, the Foundation of *Evil* is thereby laid as well as of *Good*, and it cannot be otherwise: and God's *Foreknowledge* of humane Actions cannot alter the Nature of Liberty at all, or make
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him the efficient Cause of them; any more than his *Knowledge of necessary Truth* makes him the Cause of its Existence: as all Truth wou'd be the same, whether God knew it or not; so all *humane Actions* wou'd be the same, whether God foreknew them or not.

P. 22. *Thirdly, A. C. concludes: To admit that any created Being can act in a manner contrary to what it does, or fulfil any other End, is, I apprehend, tantamount to allowing it to be independent of the Deity; and consequently, to have it in its Election and Power to thwart the Schemes of the great Author and Superintendant of all things; and thereby to bring Good and Evil on itself, and the rest of the Creation—What Contradiction more irreconcilable, than that any thing shou'd resist his Will, for whose Good Pleasure, and by whose Power alone it was created!*

All this is nothing but supposing (without proving) it a Contradiction that God shou'd endue the humane *Mind*, or any Creature, with Liberty of Action. For if Liberty is a Perfection possible to be
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pens'd according to his Works; to be made happy by obeying his Laws, or to be made miserable if he disobeys them; and no Power whatsoever can deliver him out of God's hands. Is such a Creature then *independent of God*? On the contrary, as his Subjection to God's providential Government and final Judgment is the greatest, so it is the only *Dependency* which a *rational* Creature as such can be under unto God.

Nor again, is it any Consequence of Liberty, that Man will have it in his *Election* and *Power* to *thwart the Schemes*, or *resist the Will* of the great Author of his Being. The very Supposition of God's enduing him with Liberty is a Contradiction to this Consequence, which *A. C.* argues most weakly that it infers. For, supposing *humane Liberty*, it must be suppos'd from the Nature of it, that the *Will* of God, and the Scheme of his Government form'd by it, is a *moral* Providence and Superintendency, like that of a *rational* Monarch over his Subjects, who gives them Laws (which they have Power to observe or

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not)

not) enjoining Obedience to them, and establishing them with the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments: and it cannot but be supposed to be God's *Will*, when he invested humane Nature with *Liberty* and *Volition*, that Man's *Will* should be the *immediate* and *efficient* Cause of his Actions; and that he should *freely choose* either Good or Evil: it is a Contradiction to suppose otherwise. So that whether we act agreeably to the Laws of God, or contrary to them, we do not *thwart* the Scheme of his Creation, or resist the *Will* of his Providence in the Government of the World; because it is his *Will* that we should *act freely*, and have it in our Power either *to do* or *not to do* his Commandments; that he may appear to be a *moral* and *righteous* Governor, by rewarding those who *choose* to do that which is *right* and *good*; and by punishing those who *wilfully* commit *Evil*.

If *A. C.* means nothing by God's *Will*, but his particular express Laws which he has commanded to be observ'd, and which the Notion of Liberty supposes a

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Power to resist; then his Reasoning is a childish Quibble: And it is so far from being *a Contradiction that any Thing should resist this Will*, that it is absurd that God shou'd propose or manifest any Thing to be his *Will* unto Men, unless he had given them Liberty *to do or not do* it. To what Purpose is it for God to make known to Man, that any Thing is his *Will* which he wou'd have him *to do*, if he has no Power *not to do it*? But if *A. C.* means (as he ought to do) that *Will* of God by which in his Wisdom he form'd the Scheme, and appointed the End of his Creation and Government of *rational* Creatures, this End is answer'd, and the divine Providence has its design'd Effect, whether we do *Good* or *Evil*: because God's Original *Will* and *Design* was, that all his *rational* Creatures should be happy or miserable by their own *voluntary* Actions and Behaviour.

And as this Power in Man of acting *freely* either Good or Evil, is the very *Essence* and *Ground* of all *Morality* and *Religion*; without which God can no more be worship'd by Men, than by
Stocks


Stocks and Stones; and as all Piety and Adoration of God by *Prayers, Praises* and *Thanksgivings*, is no more real Religion, if perform'd without *Choice* or *Will*, than the *Mechanical* Motions of *inanimate* Bodies, the Noise of the Air, or the *inarticulate* Sounds of Brutes can be call'd *Piety* or *religious Worship*: so the denying of humane Liberty dos most evidently leave Man *to live without God in the World*, and in a State of rank *Atheism*. For it is prov'd, that it is impossible for him to pay any proper *Worship* to God, without doing it by *Intention, Choice* and *Will*; and the Doctrine of *Fate* and *Necessity* does also take away the Ground of the divine *Judgement* in conferring Rewards and Punishments, by taking away all *moral* Obligations, and the Distinction betwixt *Virtue* and *Vice, Good* and *Evil*, on which it is founded. So that the inevitable Consequence of the wretched Hypothesis which this unhappy Writer maintains, is downright *Irreligion* and *Atheism*.

I shall, for a Conclusion, leave with this Gentleman *A. C.* the Words of that
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greatest Master of Reason that ever liv'd, the late Dr. *Clarke*, who ends his *Remarks upon the Philosophical Enquiry concerning humane Liberty*, in this manner; *viz.* "I cannot make an End, without earnestly desiring this Author seriously to consider with himself, *what* it is that he has all this Time been pleading for. For, though it might be suppos'd possible, that, among *necessary Agents*, a Sort of a *Machine* of Government might be carried on by such *Weights* and *Springs* of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, as *Clocks* and *Watches* (supposing them *to feel* what is done to them) are *rewarded* and *punish'd* withal; yet in Truth and Reality, according to this Supposition, there is nothing *intrinsically good* or *evil*, there is nothing *personally just* or *unjust*, there is no *Behavior* of *rational Creatures* in any Degree *acceptable* or *unacceptable* to God *Almighty*. Consider the Consequence of this. *Superstition* and *Bigotry* (Things very *Mechanical*, as well as very *Mischievous* to Mankind) can
 " never

“ never be rooted out, but by persua-
“ ding Men to look upon themselves as
“ *rational* Creatures, and to implant in
“ their Minds *rational Notions of Reli-*
“ *gion: Religion* there can be none,
“ without a *moral Difference* of Things;
“ *a moral Difference* of Things there
“ cannot be, where there is no Place
“ for *Action*; and *Action* there can be
“ none, without *Liberty*.

F I N I S.



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